This paper is aimed to establish the relationship between China's learning curve and the confidence in WTO and multilateral institutions as a whole. The following questions would be asked:
What has China learned from the experience of dealing with WTO, through utilizing antidumping measures to reduce imports competiting pressure to domestic manufacturers, and DSM (dispute settlement mechanism) to defend its growing international economic interests?
As an increasingly diversified country, how have different parts of the CCP, the bureaucracy and social interests perceived the experience with WTO, and how well does the learning curve go up gradually in the past decade? How do the different parts of decision making process interact with each other, and come to decisions related to WTO and the issues of global governance?
How and in what framework has the learning realized? As Wang Yong (1999， 2002 , how has China's state -centered institutions helped the learning and adapting toward international trading system and international economic governance as a whole ?
How effectively has China relied on WTO rules to constrain the behaviors of protectionism of other trading partners, seen in the eyes of different parts of decision process?
What other factors work with this learning experience to strengthen China's confidence in WTO? Finally, what implications can we draw from China's experience of participating in WTO to the country's participation in the global governance structure as a whole?
After ten years in WTO: restructuring of the state -market -society relationship in China
The most important change since China joined WTO , has taken place in the relationship among state, market and society. The WTO accession has ushered in a brand new era of China's reform and opening up, which still can be claimed as the continuation of reform and opening up before 2001. As some analysts (Chi Fulin, 2002; Wang Yong, 2003; 2006) predicted accurately at the moment of the accession, joining WTO would produce a mechanism of reversed direction of reform, which would reset the pace and agenda of China's reform. They argued, before WTO accession, the government was able to set the agenda and pace of reform and opening up based on its own interests, objectives and understanding of the conditions of China and the global economy; but after the WTO accession, China have to follow its commitments in the accession protocol and WTO rules when making decision. Generally, in this new context of WTO membership, Chinese government has to make great effort to meet these externally imposed demands and standards, to push forward comprehensive reforms. As a result, WTO accession has helped restructure the relationship between state, market and society. This "reversed direction" reform agenda setting, may have been the development concerned by some critics about the decision of joining WTO, some accusation about "losing sovereignty" to western developed countries (Han Deqiang, 2000) .
In the transformation brought forth by WTO accession, we observe that the state or government changes its role from a manager of enterprises and a monopolizer of information toward a provider of public service to the market players (enterprises ) and the society. The central and local government have set up service system to help Chinese enterprises to deal with industrial harm caused by imports, and trade remedy measures targeting Chinese exports abroad, reflected in the cases of Datong and Shenzhen, which will be discussed later. On the other hand, the government especially WTO affairs team with the Ministry of Commerce, in order to conduct a successful commercial diplomacy, needs Chinese enterprises to report their complaints about other countries' trade and investment environment. The government officials truly hope the enterprises can play an active role in this regard.
The society has become increasingly open and diversified, and the WTO accession has assisted this process.
China: a learner of WTO rules
The constraining power of WTO commitments has been evident, and during the decade Chinese government has continued to made great effort to meet the WTO rules which are regarded as standard to judge policy proposals compatible with international norms.
Modifying the old law and regulations to be compatible with the WTO rules was perceived as a part of learning new rules. And harmonizing Chinese laws and regulations with WTO rules and the accession protocol was regarded as a great success by government officials to meet China's commitment to the obligation of a responsible member of WTO.
Through abolishing, revising and promulgating over 300 laws and regulations and the central government level and 190,000 laws at the local government level, China showed its commitment to integrate in the world economy and embrace WTO's principles of non-discrimination, transparency and rule of law (Yi Xiaozhun, 2011) . In order to adapt to the accession commitments, Chinese government has modified the parts of the laws and regulations incompatible with WTO rules, and accelerated the pace of legislation to make new laws and regulations in the fields of trade, distribution and market disciplines. According to another source, after joining the WTO , the central government organized a large number of training classes to major provincial and municipal leaders to disseminate WTO related knowledge. Meanwhile, according to industry characteristics and the conditions of different parts of the country, the central and local governments provided more than 400 WTO training courses and seminars to local businesses and organization leaders. After this general knowledge education, China's WTO training has shifted focus on specific industries and local professionals, by offering seminars and training to backbone research institutes and experts to carry out special research projects. among officials and public. To do this is aimed to meet the country's commitment to WTO to showcase China as a "responsible big power", but also to serve the government strategies to push forward market-oriented reforms which seemed to have lost momentum before the WTO accession.
The context of learning: a general confidence in WTO
The WTO accession ever caused debate in China. The most popular concern was to worry about the competitiveness of Chinese industries in face of the competition from multinational corporations (MNCs). Hence some comments was to perceive the WTO accession as "wolf coming", to do damage to the base of Chinese economy.
But the top leadership insisted on the necessities of WTO accession to China's reform and position in the global economy. Since mid-1990s, they promoted the new concept of "integrating with international norms", a strategy designed to take advantage of the accession negotiation to push forward the state-owned enterprises reform by meeting the membership obligations. The vision and the politically brave decision of the leadership has opened a decade of growth, prosperity, and a rising status in the global economy.
The general public has been generally optimistic about the impact of WTO accession, to contrast the concerns of a small group of elites. At the doorway to the WTO membership, majority of Chinese public agreed to a positive view of the decision, according to one poll done by the Social Survey Institute of China (SSIC)in November 15，1999. This poll showed that 98.9 percent of interviewees shared Premier Zhu Rongji's judgment that "China joining WTO is in favor of the interest of Chinese people as well." 80 percent people believed that after the WTO accession the tariff rate would be reduced, beneficial to raising the people's living standard.
3 After China gained the WTO membership, SSIC conducted the same survey in 2004 and 2007 . In December 2004 percent of the people in the survey confirmed that the WTO accession had brought "positive" changes to China, reflected in more market oriented reforms undertaken, increasing export, improvement of government service and so on. 4 In the survey of 2007, majority interviewees talked about cheaper goods (91%) , more job creation (69%), setting a more solid foundation to the international economic position(79%) and a strengthening international political position of China(72%).
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In 2011 events celebrating the tenth anniversary of China, Chinese government officials continue to give a positive hail the economic achievement since the country joined the WTO.
During the past 10 years, "Chinese economy was growing fast and has injected strong impetus to the global economy". For instance, China's GDP growth rate averaged 10.5%
annually; household income increased from about 800 to 3300USD; China has also grown from the sixth to the second largest trading country in the world (Yi Xiaozhun, 2011) .
We can argue that the popular support of people and the realized potential of growth tapped by the WTO accession have mutually strengthened each other, which has created a generally positive environment where China's "learning" about WTO rules and practices has taken place.
Learning process: restructuring the relationship between government and market WTO accession has helped restructure the relationship between government and market.
The central and local governments are transforming their role from a power monopolizer to a public service provider. Undoubtedly, the market oriented nature of WTO, working with China's market reform policy, has made this transformation possible.
In a former study about the institutional politics of China's WTO accession (Wang, 1999; 2002) , the writer discloses the state-centered policy making process involving complicated and sometimes frustrated policy coordination among different government agencies and a needed top leadership intervention in order to push forward the pace of negotiation. Only in the late years before the accession , public and companies were consulted in the final negotiations, as some form of response to the rising complaints and skepticism about no policy transparency and possibly excessive concessions to foreign countries.
The public has paid a great attention to the potential changes the WTO accession to
Chinese government behavior, and urged the government be more open and transparent in decision making. By setting up the WTO affairs department(Moftec, or later Mofcom) and local WTO affairs centers, the Chinese government promised to take the role of public service provider, to extend assistance to Chinese companies to deal with overseas trade remedy suitcases and resisting the impact of imports.
Emphasizing that the Chinese enterprises should become the subject of dealing with trade friction, Chinese officials tend to think a strong government is still needed, but different from its former role of strong intervention in economy, it should be a strong public service provider to serve the interests of enterprises. As Zhang Xiangchen (Zhang, 2007) director general of Moftec department of WTO affairs stated in 2007，Chinese enterprises were facing extremely complicated trade friction and trading environment which they were not familiar with and were not able to handle effectively. He cited REACH of Europe as an example, which involved thousands of products, and once implemented companies had to pay and register. In his view, the government had to extend assistance and service to them, by setting up service centers equipped with database. While building pressure on EU, the government had to help Chinese companies to adapt to the changing regulatory environment. 6 We can attribute some reasons to the needed strong role of government in dealing with trade friction. The most important one is the underdevelopment of professional trading or industrial organizations in China, and the extremely weak ability of the companies to handle these challenges. 
Learning to protect domestic industries with WTO rules
In the public education about the WTO accession negotiation, one benefit China could have is to take WTO rules against the discriminatory treatment on Chinese exporters imposed by foreign partners. For example, it was argued that China can use multilateral WTO rules to deter or replace the US unilateral rules, as imposed by the US in the prior trade disputes (Wang, 2007) . In ten years, the value of WTO rules has become more evident in checking the rise of trade protectionism in the time of tremendous growth of Chinese exports and accordingly more trade friction. In the same time China has become the largest exporter, the country has also boosted its status of importer to the ranking of the second largest importer. With increasing confidence after getting more familiar with WTO rules, and driven by rapid surge of imports and great This system is claimed to be guided with the principle "serve industry and enterprises" (Zhang, 2009 ).
The good practices of Shenzhen include building early warning system about export friction. For example, in 2005 they developed the antidumping and industrial harm warning system, conducting the first comprehensive research of foreign antidumping regulations and cases including US "Section 337" investigation and the issue of alternative country in EU antidumping investigation. A database including import and export trade and trade dispute, was founded (Zhang, 2009 ).
On the other hand, the Shenzhen WTO affairs center has actively involved in WTO trade policy review process and bilateral policy consultation process channeling views and complaints about foreign trade and investment barriers faced by local enterprises abroad. In this regard, Shenzhen WTO affairs center has bridged the government and business community (Zhang, 2009 ).
Shenzhen is a good example to show how the government-sponsored WTO affairs center in a coastal and developed area has organized and coordinated to help local enterprises and exporters defend their legitimate interests. In the hinterland province Shanxi, some successful cases of defending domestic industrial interests by applying trade remedy measures are seen. The successful case of the Oak Hill Group of Datong antidumping, reflects the transformation of the local government toward a role of public service provider, and cooperative relationship with domestic enterprises (Li, 2010) .
Since 2003, the Oak Hill Group of Datong, Shanxi province, has continued to pick up the three antidumping cases against imported chloroprene rubber from Japan, U.S. and EU.
Its accusations were verified and supported by the law, and succeeded imposing antidumping import tariff on these imports: First of all, the original antidumping investigation was won to levy 2-151% tariff on the dumping imported chloroprene rubber ; second, the Oak hill won midterm review investigation and adjusted the antidumping duties from 9.9-43.9%the
on dumping imported neoprene ; third, winning "sunset" review investigation, which decided to continue imposition of import tariffs to the dumping neoprene.
In the report released by the Datong Business Bureau (Li, 2010) , several points are perceived as important in ensuring the legitimacy and success of these three antidumping cases, including depth study of anti-dumping rules, strictly examining the key and details related to anti-dumping prosecution. For example, meeting the requirements about the qualification of applicant, petition content and evidence accompanied, well prepared to present for the final decision by the Ministry of Commerce on file.
On the other hand, the Datong municipal WTO affairs center report summarizes their practices encouraging Chinese enterprises to pick up WTO rules to safeguard its legitimate interests. As the report argues, the legal awareness of the city's foreign trade enterprises is generally low, and in case of international trade friction, their response is not positive, but only intends to stay away and ultimately subject to sanctions and deep damage to their interests. The report cites one example, that is, the city's activated carbon companies were accused of dumping, but none of them stood up to take the case, and lost the market in the end. The report emphasizes the significance of promoting foreign trade law and WTO rules among Chinese business community, and the role of helping them to organize and go to collective suitcase.
As the Datong report argues, though the petitioners should be companies in anti-dumping cases, the local government trade agency should play a role of coordinating with Ministry of Commerce, municipal Foreign Law Society, Municipal Association of import and export enterprises and foreign-invested Enterprises Association and other organizations, to set up a smooth working environment ensuring the processing of cases. In the end of the report, it points out the direction of the future work, such as establishment of industrial harm early warning mechanism, and training more qualified trade law prosecution lawyers to support corporate litigation, which should be within the service function of the local government (Li, 2010) .
The Shenzhen and Datong cases are important to showcase the deep transformation of the relationship between players of state and market, increasingly characterized with the self-definition of public service provider by the local government, and the will to work with enterprises to defend domestic interests. Though with this adjustment, it is interesting to recognize the "central" role of the local government sponsored WTO centers in assisting the corporate sector to fight for its own interest within the WTO legal framework.
The other side of learning: rising concerns about WTO rules
As expected, the WTO accession has not only brought forth growth and prosperity to China, but also has made an increasingly pluralistic and diversified society in existence. In the past decade, we heard reflection and criticism about China's trade-driven model, and on a more general term, the continuous debate about the cost and benefit of China's WTO (Zhang, Xiangchen, 2007) . In dealing with anti-subsidy investigation launched by trading partners, interagency coordination is highly valued as well, because this kind of investigation involves different functions of Chinese government, such as taxation, customs, inspection and finance. As it is stated, it is very important to decide which agency plays the role of a major coordinator to draft a standard explanation, otherwise it may cause adverse effects to the final judgment about the case (Zhang, Xiangchen, 2007) .
As stated above, the relationship between state and market has experienced great transformation, in the process of the transition from planned economy toward market economy. Though the state and government give up the power of directly running the enterprises, the government policies to sponsor Chinese companies especially the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been continued, and even strengthened in some period, based on the arising concerns over weak competitiveness in international marketplace. In past years, some new development of the state and market relationship has taken shape, mainly the incentive measures to encourage "indigenous innovation" and "SOEs crowding out privately owned enterprises (POEs)" as mass media discuss and cause criticism inside and outside China.
In this broad context, the tense relationship has been developed among different departments and functions. On one hand, the group of central government agencies has strengthened their intervention in the growth of industries and technology, to boost the competitiveness of state-owed and private economies, as some studies label these incentives Obviously, the official policy is not to close the door of the cultural markets, but to grow up and compete with western cultural enterprises under the same rules of WTO. This positive mentality would be seen in other fields, and to be a quick learner, and boost the learning curve is the only way in fierce international competition.
Conclusion
The ten years of WTO accession has brought forth tremendous changes to China. Most important, the country is experiencing restructuring the relations between state, market and society. The state is still powerful, but has largely reshaped its role to a public service provider to the market and the society. The Chinese society has been much more open and diversified than before.
In this context of great transformation, Chinese have developed a contradictory self-image about itself and the outside world: a strong power and a vulnerable country; a beneficiary and victim of international trading system; a defender and a critic of the international system.
As a new member, still in learning, China is not familiar with the system and the rules as old members are. The elites and public of China have developed a mixed feeling about WTO, some sense of achievement with some sense of frustration.
Though the size of Chinese economy and the number of trading have become very impression to the world-China is also proud of it as well, the cost and benefit of being part of the WTO has become a debatable topic, for the reasons showing in the debate: China may be trading too much to sacrifice its environment and labor; China faces difficulties in pushing forward industrial upgrading because of the increasingly strict measures on technology transfer to China imposed by multinational corporations, and so on. These are the reasons for
The most important lesson China has learned from the impact of the global financial crisis, is this one: as Chinese economy has become inseparable part of the global economy, China doesn't have the other choice except continuing to work with WTO and rely on the WTO rules to protect itself.
China's experience of learning in the past ten years since the WTO accession has profound implication to the role of China in global governance and the future of global governance. It is clearly the consideration of the growing practical interests which would continue to make Chinese decision makers and the public to work with and would make great efforts to strengthen the multilateral trading system and contribute more to the international public good, though sometimes it would be reluctant to do.
